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Wireless body area networks (WBAN), also called wireless body sensor networks (WBSN),
consist of a collection of wireless sensor nodes used to monitor and assess various human
physiological conditions, which can then be used by healthcare professionals to help them
make important healthcare decisions. They can be used to prevent disease, help diagnosis a
disease, or manage the symptoms of a disease. An extremely important aspect of WBAN is
security to protect a patient’s healthcare information, as a hacker could potentially cause fatal
harm. Current security measures are implemented in software at the MAC layer and higher,
not in the physical layer. Previous research demonstrated a chaotic encryption cipher to add a
layer of security in the physical layer. This cipher exploits different properties of the Lorenz
chaotic system to encrypt and decrypt digital data. Decryption involved synchronizing
two chaotic signals to recover original data by sharing a state between the transmitter
and receiver. In this thesis, we further develop the encryption system by implementing
wireless capabilities. We use two approaches: the first by using commercially available
wireless microcontrollers that communicate using Bluetooth Low Energy, and the second
by the design and fabrication of a dual-band low noise amplifier (LNA) that can be used
in a receiver for WBANs collecting data from implantable and on-the-body sensors. For
the first approach, a custom Bluetooth Low Energy profile was created for streaming the
analog encrypted signal, and signal processing was done at the receiver side. For the second
approach, the LNA operates at the Medical Implant Communication System (MICS) band
and the 915 MHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band simultaneously through
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1.1 Wireless Body Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) have been a huge advancement in technology and have
transformed the modern world. Wireless sensor networks consist of a collection of sensor
nodes that are used to monitor and detect information, and then send that information
to the outside world. Sensor nodes usually consist of a sensor, a microcontroller, a radio
transceiver, a battery, and possibly external memory. They are used in various applications
such as agriculture, traffic monitoring, fitness and wellness, military, medical, and social
networking. Some specific application examples are vineyard monitoring, bridge monitoring,
and animal monitoring [1]. Wireless body sensor network (BSN), also referred to as body area
network (BAN), is a type of wireless sensor network focused on applications with the human
body. Sensor nodes are placed around, on, or inside of the body to monitor physiological
conditions. The collected data can be used by medical professionals to make important
healthcare decisions. BSNs are typically used to track a patient over time in order to observe




There are different protocols that a wireless sensor node can use to communication data. The
most common are Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Zigbee, and the IEEE 802.15.6 standard.
The IEEE 802.15.6 is the newest standard for body area networks and is recommended
for BAN applications; however, the technology for this standard is premature and under-
developed.
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
The Bluetooth Low Energy protocol was introduced in version Bluetooth 4.0, and is branded
as ”Bluetooth Smart.” The main difference from classic Bluetooth is that it consumes less
power, making it suitable for cell phones, wearable hardware such as fitness trackers, etc.
At it’s core, Bluetooth consists of the host and the controller. The host defines the upper
layers of the protocol, and the controller defines the lower layers of the protocol, such as
the radio and link manager layers. BLE sends radio signals at 2.4 GHz and uses Gaussian
frequency shift modulation. There are 40 channels between 2.402 and 2.480 GHz, each with
2 MHz bandwidth, that BLE can operate and send data on. To avoid interference with other
protocols that use the 2.4 GHz band, such as Wifi and Zigbee, BLE uses a frequency hopping
technique, called frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), to hop between channels if
there is any interference.
Zigbee
Zigbee is a communication protocol with low power, low data rate, and short range, and is
specially built for sensor networks. It supports up to 65000 devices in its network. Zigbee
networks consist of a coordinator, routers, and end devices. A coordinator is the root of the
network, and routers are intermediate nodes between the coordinator and end devices. Zigbee
network topolgies include star, mesh, tree, and cluster tree. The star topology contains no
routers. Mesh and tree topologies have routers; however, mesh requires every node to be
connected to every other node except end devices. Unlike mesh topology, the routers are not
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interconnected in the tree topology. Clustered tree topology means routers are connected to
other routers to extend the network range.
Zigbee can operate at 915 MHz or 2.4 GHz. At the 915 MHz band, it has 10 channels
between 902-928 MHz spaced 2 MHz apart; at the 2.4 GHz band, it has 16 channels between
2.4-2.4835 GHz spaced 5 MHz apart. To avoid interference with other protocols, Zigbee uses
direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), which spreads the signal over a wider bandwidth.
802.15.6 Standard
The first standard specifically for body area networks (BAN) is the IEEE 802.15.6 standard
[3], which supports low power, short-range, and highly reliable communication. This
standard defines multiple frequency bandwidths for the physical layer, which includes
human body communication (HBC: 21 MHz), narrowband communication (NB: 402-405,
420-450, 863-870, 902-928, 950-958, 2360-400, and 2400-2483.5 MHz ), and ultra-wideband
communication (UWB: bandwidth - 499.2 MHz, 10 center frequencies ranging from 3.5 MHz
to 10 MHz). This standard was published in 2012, and research relating to this standard
are still underdeveloped.
1.2 Previous Work
Previously, a cipher was developed using discrete components that utilized time-scaling
chaotic shift keying [4, 5]. This system is based on the Lorenz function, which is a
mathematical model defined as,
ẋ = σ(y − x)
ẏ = (β − z)x− y
ż = xy − ρz
(1.1)
where σ, β, and ρ are real positive values, and only certain relations result in a chaotic
system. A plot of the system is shown in Fig. 1.1. The system can be bounded when
meeting certain conditions, and a small change in initial conditions results in significantly
different outcomes and trajectories. These properties can be exploited for an encryption
3
Figure 1.1: The Butterfly attractor from plotting x vs. y of the Lorenz function.
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algorithm. Two chaotic systems can be synchronized and their trajectories matched, known
as chaotic synchronization, which can be exploited for decryption algorithms. Chaotic shift
keying (CSK) is the encryption/decryption algorithm that uses these two properties, and
the system equations are,
ẋ1 = σ(x2 − x1) ż1 = σ(z2 − z1)
ẋ2 = (β(m)− x3)x1 − x2 ż2 = (β0 − z3)x1 − z2
ẋ3 = x1x2 − ρx3 ż3 = x1z2 − ρz3
(1.2)
In these equations, the transmitter states are x1, x2, and x3 and the receiver states are
z1, z2, and z3. β is the modulator. x1 is the encrypted signal and the shared state with the
receiver.
The CSK algorithm is vulnerable to the return map attack, where the local minimum and
maximum with respect to time can be monitored to discover time-varying characteristics. To
protect against this attack, a time scaling factor, λ(x,m), is added to create a time-scaling
chaotic shift keying algorithm. The message m is a digital signal that can be 0 or 1. The
system equations are,
ẋ1 = σ(x2 − x1)λ(x,m)
ż1 = σ(z2 − z1)λ(z, 0)
ẋ2 = ((β(m)− x3)x1 − x2)λ(x,m)
ż2 = ((β(m)− z3)x1 − z2)λ(z, 0)
ẋ3 = (x1x2 − ρx3)λ(x,m)




 λm if dx = 0λ1−m if dx = 1
 (1.4)
where d(x) is the decision engine function, which uses a series of logic gates to perform a λ
selection and is a function of the message signal, time, and the states of the system.
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The full circuit is shown in Fig. 1.2. An algorithm is used to extract the original
information signal, which uses periodic averaging, thresholding, and the shared state. More
details regarding this system can be found in [4].
1.3 Organization
In Chapter 2, a literature review on wireless sensor nodes, chaotic ciphering, and multi-band
low noise amplifiers. Chapter 3 details the system implementation of the wireless chaotic
encryption cipher. Chapter 4 details the design, fabrication, and results of the dual-band
LNA. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and presents possible future work.
6




2.1 Wireless Body Area Network
Even though wireless body area network technology is in a primitive stage, it is a hot topic
in research and numerous papers are dedicated on either one aspect of a sensor node, such
as the transceiver or sensor, or the entire functioning sensor node is presented to use in
WBANs. Sensor nodes consist of the sensors, a micro-controller, a radio transceiver, and
usually a battery.
A wearable sensor node was demonstrated in [6] that used electrocardiography (ECG) and
photolenthysmography (PPG) sensor modules, an energy harvesting module, a low-power
microcontroller, and a Bluetooth Low Energy module. They used a photovoltaic energy
source to extend the battery life of the node. In [7], the presented sensor node contains
an accelerometer, temperature sensor, and pulse sensor. The core microcontroller is an
ATmega328P, and a Bluetooth Low Energy module is used to transmit data to a smartphone.
The sensor node contains a flexible solar panel as a power source for energy harvesting, and
stores energy is a supercapacitor to extend battery life. Experimental results confirm that
the sensor node can operate autonomously for 24 hours, as long as it gets some sunlight
everyday. A zigbee-based wireless sensor network is presented in [8], using sensor nodes
that consist of a physiological parameter sensor (heart rate), a MSP430 microcontroller,
and a Zigbee transceiver. The system demonstrates the potential of remote healthcare
monitoring. A sensor node for glucose monitoring is presented in [9]. The node consists
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of an optical glucose sensor, an energy harvesting unit, an energy storage element, and a
wireless microcontroller that uses Bluetooth Low Energy.
These examples are just a few found in literature about wireless sensor nodes and/or
wireless sensor networks. However, the only security measures that the systems take are
within the communication protocols. Most encryption efforts outside of the communication
protocol, if any, are done through software at the MAC layer or higher.
Combining chaos to wireless sensor networks, most work found in literature focuses on
software chaotic encryption algorithms. In [10], a fast reaching finite time synchronization
approach is verified in numerical simulation for chaotic systems, and its application to
medical image encryption is explored. Secret keys are generated from synchronized chaotic
systems, and an adaptive terminal sliding mode tracking approach is used to synchronize
the chaos at the receiver and transmitter ends. A block encryption algorithm is presented
in [11] that uses chaotic mapping along with other different types of mapping. Lower power
consumption make it potentially suitable for wireless network applications.
2.2 Security
The two types of encryption are symmetric key encryption and asymmetric key encryption.
Symmetric-key ciphers use the same private key for encrypting and decrypting data.
Although it is a fast method of encryption, it depends on the sender exchanging the key
with the receiver [12]. Asymmetric-key ciphers have one public key used for encryption and
one private key used for decryption, where the private key is only known by the receiver
[13]. One common way of hacking the cipher is through brute force method, where all of
the possible combinations are tried until the right key is found to read the encrypted data.
Other methods are through side-channel attacks, where the attacks exploit a system error
in the cipher, or cryptanalysis, where a flaw in the encryption algorithm is exploited [12].
Cryptography is a fundamental part of all online communication and modern day
computers. Various different algorithms exist that are pivotal to modern day technology and
communication, utilizing asymmetric-key encryption. Once large quantum computers exist,
many of these cryptosystems are expected to fail [13]. Classic computers relay on a binary
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physical state of zero or one, called a bit; quantum computers relay on a particle’s quantum
state, known as a qubit. Qubits do not have a defined state, but rather a superposition of
multiple states that simultaneously exist and are entangled together. Some companies have
already made strives towards successful quantum computing. For example, IBM made a 5-
qubit processor in 2016, and have continued upgrading the qubit count since then. Google,
announced a 72-qubit processor [14]. Since quantum computing is on the horizon, security
methods other than symmetric and asymmetric security are gaining importance. This is
because quantum computing has the capacity to break cryptography keys using brute force
method where it was not previously possible before using modern day computers. Chaotic
ciphering is an alternative method of encryption that can implemented with low power
electronics.
Communication systems that utilize chaotic encryption are scarce in literature. While
efforts have been made to implement a chaotic communication system in digital and analog
electronics, most implementations are software-based. Even rarer are the chaotic circuit
implementations that have been constructed or fabricated. Because a chaotic system is very
sensitive to initial conditions, most of the demonstrated circuits in literature had problems
with accuracy due to mismatch and variance in component parameters.
In 1993, circuit implementations of the Lorenz chaotic system presented and demon-
strated for the use of encryption for communication applications [15]. Two approaches were
presented. First, the data was masked with a chaotic signal, and the receiver regenerated the
mask to subtract it from the received signal and recover the data. Second, the coefficients
of the chaotic system were modulated in the transmitter and the receiver detected the
synchronization error. Since then, some circuit designs have been presented in FPGAs,
using discrete components, and fabricated at the IC level.
One of the first experimentally verified chaotic encryption ICs is demonstrated in [16]
where they implement a monolithic chaotic oscillator based on Chua’s model for chaotic
systems. The design incorporated a nonlinear resistor. A multiscroll chaotic oscillator is
presented in [17] by using floating gate MOSFETs to implement the nonlinear function, and
a later paper explores the limitations of this design [18]. Another experimentally verified
cryptography IC is found in [19] that operates at the baseband level and uses a Lorenz based
10
chaotic system. The design implements differential circuits that implement mathematical
functions to build the chaotic system. In [20], a chaotic oscillator is presented that uses
a four-dimensional model of chaos from combining the Lorenz and Stenflo equations. The
conditions for synchronization are defined, which can be exploited for decryption. In [21],
a double-scroll chaotic system is implemented using OTAs. In [22], two designs of the Lu
chaotic oscillator were presented.
One work in literature that incorporates chaotic-based encryption with bio-medical
devices is presented in [23]. The work presents a symmetric encryption method that avoids
exchanging the keys wirelessly. Instead, a chaotic system is used to generate pseudo-
random keys from the preset initial conditions in the transmitter and receiver. Although this
implementation uses chaotic systems, it is still considered a type of symmetric key ciphering
that has a key length of 128 bits and is potentially breakable through quantum computing.
FPGA implementations of various chaotic-based systems have been presented in litera-
ture. An advantage of FPGAs is that there is no mismatch between the transmitter and
receiver, which has been a problem in different implementation platforms due to the chaotic
system’s sensitivity to initial conditions. The only noise depends on noise sensibility [13].
For example, [24] presents an FPGA implementation of the Lorenz’s chaotic generator,
and [25] presents an FPGA implementation of Chua’s chaotic system. In [26], a wireless
transmission system is presented that uses chaotic encryption with an A5/1 algorithm on an
FPGA platform. It uses a SIM300 module to realize wireless transmission. Even though this
system is chaotic-based, the chaotic systems are not synchronized and the wireless module
does not stream any data.
Implementations of chaotic-based systems can also be found using discrete components.
In [27], a Lorenz-based discrete circuit is implemented using a master transmitter and slave
receiver. In [28], a Lorenz design consists of analog multipliers, operational amplifiers, and
passive elements as discrete components. It improves the Lorenz system by using an active
control method so that the synchronization error system can be stabilized from the origin.
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2.3 Multi-Band LNAs
Multiple strategies exist for designing an LNA that operates in two or more frequency bands.
One strategy is to design an LNA for each desired frequency band and then put the LNAs
in parallel with one another. While this offers the advantage of optimizing the performance
of each LNA, it comes at the expense of increased power, area, and receiver complexity.
Another strategy is to use wideband LNAs that cover a range of frequencies. Wideband
LNAs are used for both multi-band and multi-mode receivers where the receivers can satisfy
more than one standard protocol. Also, the ultra-wide band (UWB) frequency band is from
3.1 to 10.6 GHz, which support high data rate and bandwidth at low range, low energy
levels [29]. For these reasons, many research efforts have been made to develop and improve
wideband LNA design. Two of the biggest considerations when designing a wideband LNA
are wideband input matching and linearity. Wideband input matching can be done with a
common gate (CG) stage or a common source (CS) stage as the input stage. The common
gate stage is relatively easier to to get wideband input matching; however, it has lower gain
than its CS counterpart and degrades the noise figure (NF) of the whole circuit [30]. In a
conventional CG LNA stage, the input matching network consists of an input inductor L1







when neglecting load impedance. A low Q-factor results in wideband impedance matching





assuming channel length modulation is neglected [32]. A CS stage has higher gain and better
NF than a CG stage, but it is harder to achieve wideband input matching. Typically, a CS
stage is used with inductive degeneration or resistive feedback. The input impedance of a









where gm is the transconductance of the input transistor, L1 is the inductive degeneration,
and Cgs1 is the gate-source capacitance of the input transistor. For input matching, the real
term is set equal to 50 Ω and an input matching network is required to cancel the reactance of
Eq. 2.3 at the frequency range of interest. A CS stage with resistive feedback is similar to the
CG stage in that the resistive 50 Ω matching is set by Eq. [32]. However, the resistor degrades
noise figure by contributing the input noise. Because wideband LNAs allow interference from
unwanted covered frequeny ranges, linearity is especially important and can affect overall
performance. One common way to improve linearity is by using differential circuits to cancel
out the even order harmonics [32]. Another common method is the multiple gated transistors
method (MGTR), which adds a transistor in parallel with the main transistor and biases it
in subthreshold in order to cancel out the second order transconductance parameters of the
two transistors and therefore improve linearity. Examples of this method are found in [33]
and [34].
Although not as common in recent literature, another approach to designing a multi-band
LNA is use of CMOS switches to change the operating frequency. The switches are turned
on and off to add or remove different components in the matching networks, changing the
resonance frequency and therefore the frequency band operation by doing so. The advantages
of this approach are that they LNAs can have optimal performance at each desired frequency
bands while rejecting unwanted frequencies. The disadvantages are that the LNA is limited
to one frequency band at a time, and the CMOS switch adds parasitics to the circuit that
affect circuit operation in both on and off states. When the switch is on, it acts like a resistor
whose value is dependent on the transistor width. Too high of a resistance may result in the
matching network not being affected by the added components, and too low of a resistance
may result in a lowered Q factor of the matching network [32]. When the switch is off, it acts
like a capacitor, which will shift the resonance frequency. A few examples of this approach
are found in [35], [36], and [37].
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The use of more complicated matching networks can be used to create multiple resonance
frequencies of the desired bands. This approach has the advantage of operating at the desired
bands simultaneously and rejected unwanted frequencies at the expense of more complicated
matching networks. This approach is more commonly used for dual band operation. For
output matching, the two most common matching networks are a parallel combination of
bandpass and bandstop filters and two bandpass filters connected in series. In the former, the
bandpass filter allows a large frequency range to pass, and the bandstop filter cuts that range
in the middle to create break the passband into two, as shown in Fig. 2.1a. In the latter,
two separate bandpass filters create the two resonances at the desired frequency bands, as
shown in Fig. 2.1b. Input matching networks can range from any combination of filters or
matching network configurations such as the L-shape, T-shape, π-shape matching networks.
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(a) OMN Approach 1 (b) OMN Approach 2





This background is summarized from the TI BLE-5 User’s Guide [39].
3.1.1 OSI Model
The OSI model stands for Open System Interconnection Model, and it represents a standard
reference model for communication protocols. It illustrates how two devices communicate
with one another with 7 different layers, as shown in Fig. 3.1. The top layer is the application
layer, which contains different network applications that an end-user can use to produce data.
The data is sent to the presentation layer, where it is converted to machine language, called
translation. The bits that comprise the data get reduced, which is called compression. Then,
the data gets encrypted and sent to the session layer. The session layer has multiple roles.
This includes initializing, managing, and ending connections. It checks to see if the data is
synchronized and re-synchronizes if needed. The data continues to the transport layer, which
is responsible for segmentation/reassembly, flow control, and error control. Segmentation
takes the data from the session layer and divides it into smaller units, called segments, to
send to the network layer on the sender side; reassembly reassembles the segments from the
network layer to be able to send to the session layer on the receiver side. The Source and
Destination port numbers are added to the header. Flow control determines the amount of
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Figure 3.1: OSI Model. [40]
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data being transmitted or received. Error control checks data for corruption and re-transmits
data if there is an error.
The network layer is responsible for communication between networks and between hosts.
It determines the best path for data to take, which is known as routing. It is also responsible
for logical addressing, in which the sender and receiver’s IP addresses are added to the
header of the data unit. Data units in the network layer are called packets. To ensure
the data is transferred correctly over the physical layer, the packets get sent to the data
link layer. Through framing, the data link layer allows upper levels to access media and
provides a way to transmit meaningful bits to the receiver. Media access control (MAC)
addresses are added to the header of the data units, now called frames, through physical
addressing. The data link layer re-transmits any damaged or lost frames and maintains a
constant data rate from both the sender and receiver. When multiple devices are using the
same communication channel, the data link layer will determine which device has control
over the channel and for how long. Lastly, the physical layer converts the information bits
into physical signals that can be transmitted over local media. The physical layer provides a
clock for bit synchronization, defines the transmission rate, defines the device topology for a
given network, and defines the direction of data flow. Data starts at the application layer of
the sender side, flows down the layers, gets transmitted to the receiver side, and data flows
back up from the physical layer to the application layer [40].
3.1.2 Bluetooth 5 Stack
Similarly following the OSI model, an overview of the BLE-5 stack can be seen in Fig.
3.2. Profiles and applications sit on top of the Generic Access Profile (GAP) and Generic
Attribute Profile (GATT) layers. The Bluetooth stack consists of the host (software layers)
and the controller (hardware layers). The controller, host, and applications can all be
implemented in a single device, or the applications can reside on an external application
processor (AP) such as a smart phone or laptop. The GAP layer controls the connection
functionality of the device and interfaces with the application. The GATT layer provides
a framework for using the Attribute Protocol (ATT). Attributes are the smallest unit
of data that is communicated between Bluetooth devices. The Security Manager (SM)
18
Figure 3.2: BLE 5 Stack. [39]
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provides methods to securely exchange data. Logical Link Control and Adaption (L2CAP)
provides data encapsulation services for data units traveling through the layers, and the
Host-Controller Interface (HCI) is the interface between the L2CAP and Link Layer (LL).
Generic Access Profile (GAP)
The GAP layer is responsible for procedures for device connection (establishing, maintaining,
and terminating a link) and device configuration. There are five RF states that a device
can be in: standby, advertiser, slave, scanner, initiator, and/or master (Fig. 3.3). The
standby state is an idle, unconnected device. When a device wants to connect to another
device, it sends out an advertisement on one of the designated Bluetooth channels to say
that it is a connectable device (advertiser). The other device wanting to connect looks for
advertisements by scan requests (scanner). Device discovery occurs when the advertiser sends
a scan response back to the scanner. Then, the scanner becomes an initiator and a request
to initiate a link with the advertising device is sent. After they are connected, the scanner
and advertiser become the master and slave, respectively. GAP roles include broadcaster,
observer, peripheral, and central. The broadcaster and peripheral roles are advertisers,
while the observer and the central are the scanners. The broadcaster and observer are not
connectable, while the peripheral and central can connect to each other. Devices can operate
in one or more roles and utilize one or more states.
A connection event occurs two devices send and receive data to each other. The time
between connection events is the connection interval. The slave device can deny a particular
number of connection events. This is known as called slave latency. The maximum time
span between two successful connection events is known as the supervision time-out. The
connection terminates after this time-out.
Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) and Attribute Protocol (ATT)
The GATT layer is an abstraction of the ATT layer and is used to transfer data between
connected devices. An attribute is the smallest data unit. Characteristics are made up of
attributes and data is communicated in the form of characteristics. Every attribute has a
handle, a type or Universal Unique Identifier (UUID), and permissions. A handle is the index
20
Figure 3.3: GAP State Diagram. [39]
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of the attribute in the table, a type indicates how to interpret the data, and the permissions
enforce how an attribute can be accessed from another device. Every characteristic contains
the following attributes [39]:
• Characteristic Declaration: stores the properties, location, and type of characteristic
value
• Characteristic Value Declaration: stores the data value
• Client Characteristic Configuration: permits the GATT server to write a 0, 1, or 2
within the characteristic to allow for no updates, updates (notifications), or updates
with acknowledgements (indications), respectively.
There are two devices: GATT server and GATT client. The server device contains the
database of attributes grouped by characteristics. The GATT client communicates (reads
and writes data) with the GATT server.
In a connection between two devices, a GATT server is the device that contains the
characteristic database and the GATT client is the device that is reading or writing data
from/to the GATT server. A GATT server can independently define permissions for
each characteristic. Two permission techniques are authentication and authorization. In
authentication, characteristics cannot be read or written to until the GATT client has
undergone a pairing method that is performed within the BLE stack; in authorization,
the stack forwards any requests on the characteristics to the application layer, where the
requirements for authorization are defined. A group of characteristics is called a service, and
a group of services is called a profile, as shown in Fig. 3.4. Many profiles implement one
service, so the terms profile and service can be used interchangeably in that case.
GAP Bond Manager
The GAP Bond Manager performs pairing and bonding security processes associated with
the Security Manager (SM) protocol from the application. The module is configurable and is
responsible for the pairing process (where keys are exchanged), encrypting the link, storing
keys in the secure flash (SNV), and reconnecting if needed. The pairing methods include:
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Figure 3.4: Data units in the BLE-5 Stack.
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• Just Works: it just pairs
• Passkey Entry: an authenticated pairing method where one device displays a passcode
and the other inputs it
• Numeric Comparison: an authenticated pairing method where both devices show a
6-digit code and indicate if codes match
• Out of Band: devices send authentication information over an out of band channel
Logical Link Control and Adaption Protocol (L2CAP)
The Logical Link Control and Adaption Protocol (L2CAP) is responsible for transferring
data between the upper layers of the host and the link layer. It performs multiplexing,
segmentation, and reconstruction of the communicated information. The L2CAP channel
is the logical link between the protocol endpoints of the peer devices. A service data unit
(SDU) is a packet of data tha contains the raw data from the application with no headers,
while a protocol data unit (PDU) is the same packet of data but with L2CAP headers.
Fragmentation is the process of breaking down PDUs into smaller units, and recombination
is the process of reassembling the smaller units into complete PDUs. Similarly, segmentation
is the process of breaking a single SDU up into smaller segments, and reassembly is the
process of combining the smaller segments together into a complete SDU. These processes
that the L2CAP is responsible for is demonstrated in Fig. 3.5.
Host Controller Interface (HCI)
The host controller interface (HCI) is responsible for transferring data and commands
between the host and the controller elements of Bluetooth. This layer can use transport
protocols such as SPI or UART, or they can use function calls and code all within one
microcontroller (MCU). Executing this layer through transport protocols allows the ability
for the application to run on an external MCU to interface with the Bluetooth stack.
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Figure 3.5: L2CAP Data Flow. [39]
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Link Layer (LL) and Physical Layer (PHY)
The link layer (LL) and physical layer (PHY) have the same responsibilities as described in
the standard, general OSI model. In the Bluetooth stack, the link layer controls which of
the five RF states the device is in: standby, advertising, scanning, initiating, or connected.
When in the connected state, a device can either be a central or peripheral device. The link
layer is also responsible for scheduling, which physical channel to be on, and the length of the
data packets. The Bluetooth stack supports three different PHYs: LE 1M, 2M, and coded
PHY. LE 1M transfers data at a symbol rate and data rate of 1 Mbps, LE 2M at 2 Mbps.
One symbol is equal to one bit. Using the same transmit power, the difference between 1M
and 2M is the modulation type. In LE Coded PHY, each bit is represented by either two
or eight symbols (S2 or S8, respectively). This allows the signal range to increase, but data
throughput decreases, at a data rate of 500 kbps and 125 kbps for S2 and S8, respectively.
Table 3.1 summarizes the differences in the PHYs.
3.2 System Implementation
Portions of this section have been submitted as “A Wireless Time-Scaling Chaotic Shift
Keying Encryption System For Biosensing Systems,” to the IEEE Engineering in Medicine
and Biology Conference (EMBC), 2021.
3.2.1 Hardware
Transceiver Boards
The LAUNCHXL-CC26x2R1 evaluation board was chosen to develop the software running on
the CC2652R wireless microcontroller (MCU). This particular wireless microcontroller was
chosen because it supports Bluetooth 5.1 Low Energy and contains the same microcontroller
model that our lab has a tapeout for, the Arm Cortex-M0. In fact, the CC2642R has two
microcontrollers: the ARM Cortex-M4F that is used as the core MCU for the BLE stack and
the Arm Cortex-M0 that is used to interface with sensor data, called the sensor controller.
This allows the main MCU to consume less power by offloading some of the signal processing.
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Table 3.1: A comparison of the different PHY options in BLE-5. [39]
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The MCU has 352 kB of programmable flash, 256 kB of Read Only Memory (ROM), 8 kB
of cache SRAM, and 80 kB of ultra-low leakage SRAM. It offers many peripherals such as
GPIO pins, general-purpose timers, two UART, two SSI, I2C, and a real-time clock (RTC).
It contains eight channels for a 12-bit ADC with a sampling rate of up to 200 kSamples/sec.
DAC
A DAC is needed to convert the signal back to an analog signal on the receiver’s side in order
to run it back through the cipher to recover the original signal information. The BOOST-
DAC7551Q1 was chosen because it is a 12 bit, like the ADC on the transmitter side, and
is compatible with the BoosterPack layout that the transceiver evaluation boards use. The
DAC is compatible with SPI to communicate with the transceiver boards. To input data to
the DAC, a 16-bit word is loaded into the input shift register, under the control of a clock
signal SCLK. In normal mode, the first two bits are don’t care bits, the next two bits should
be low, and the rest of the bits are the data for the DAC with the most significant bit (MSB)
first. Data is loaded when the SYNC signal is low, and when the SYNC signal is brought
high again, the last 16 bits of data stored in the register and latched into the DAC register
and updates the DAC. The clock signal operates in Mode 1, meaning the clock polarity is
non-inverted (idle=0, active=1), and data is sampled at he falling edge of the clock.
Signal Processing Circuitry
A non-inverting summing amplifier was added in between the cipher output and the ADC
input on the transmitter side for two purposes: to provide a buffer before the ADC input
with low output resistance and to add a DC offset to the encrypted signal. The DC offset
moved the signal into the voltage range of required by the ADC of all positive values and in
between the range of 0 to 4.2 V. The schematic of the operational amplifier can be seen in
Fig. 3.6, and the derivation of the gain is as follows,










Figure 3.6: The operational amplifier circuits.
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VY = 12(VIN + Vb)
(3.2)
In an ideal operational amplifier, the voltages at both inputs are equal to each other (VX =











On the receiver side, another non-inverting summing amplifier was added after the DAC
to reverse the DC offset added on the transmitter side. An RC low pass filter was added
right before the amplifier to remove the high frequency components added from the DAC,
as shown in Fig. 3.6b. It uses the resistor from the summing amplifier and adds a shunt







|R2 + 1jωC1 |
(3.4)





Lastly, a difference operational amplifier was added added the receiver buffer to subtract
the two signals needed for decryption, shown in Fig. 3.7. The gain is calculated by first









VY = VIN2 R4R3+R4
(3.6)
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Figure 3.7: Signal extraction circuit.
31
then using superposition,
VIN2 = 0 : VOUT,A = −VIN1R2R1





VOUT = VOUT,A + VOUT,B
(3.7)




(VIN2 − VIN1) (3.8)
For the interface circuits, the LM741 operational amplifiers were used with 10 kΩ resistors
for all resistors. The capacitor in the low-pass filter is a 0.47 µF electrolytic capacitor. Bypass
capacitors were used as well.
3.2.2 Software
BLE Profile
A custom Bluetooth Low Energy profile was created that contains one custom service called
CipherService and two characteristics called CipherValue and StreamEN, as shown in Fig.
3.8. The service has a UUID equal to 0xBA55. The CipherValue characteristic has a
UUID of 0x2BAD and has read and notify properties. Its attributes include a characteristic
declaration, a characteristic value declaration, and a client characteristic configuration, where
the client characteristic configuration’s value allows for notifications. When notifications are
turned on, an alert will be sent to the receiver that the value has been changed, and no
response from the receiver is required. The CipherValue characteristic is used to hold and
update the value of the encrypted signal. The StreamEN characteristic has a UUID of 0x2BE,
and its attributes include a characteristic declaration and a characteristic value declaration.
The characteristic is readable and writable. It is initially set to zero. When the value ”01”
is written to it, it turns on the ADC through a callback function to record and stream data.
To turn off stream, write another value besides ”01”.
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Fig. 3.9 shows a block diagram of the entire cipher system, and Fig. 3.10 shows the physical
setup of the system. It starts off with a low frequency, digital signal that would be produced
by a sensor. More specifically, sensors that could be used with this system are those with
a quasi-digital output, in which information is encoded in its frequency. The encryption
module masks the digital data using time-scaling chaotic shift keying and makes it look like
a noisy, random signal. This analog signal is the input to the transmitter board, which
continuously samples it with a built-in 12-bit ADC buffer and stores it in a 16-bit unsigned
integer array storing 10 samples when the StreamEN characteristic is enabled. Once the
array is full of samples, the array is converted from type 16-bit unsigned integer to type
8-bit unsigned integer storing 20 samples, since the BLE stack transfers data in bytes. Once
converted, a notification is sent to the receiver that the value has changed and the transmitter
sends the receiver the updated data. The maximum data length that BLE can send in one
packet for notifications is 20 bytes.
On the receiver side, the Bluetooth data packet is collected and processed. After
processing the notification signal and extracting the sent data, called the payload, the receiver
converts the type 8-bit array back to type 16-bit to be able to communicate the value to the
DAC through SPI and convert it back to an analog signal. The encrypted analog signal goes
through the cipher again to get another chaotic signal for decryption, and the two signals
are subtracted in circuitry to recover the original signal information.
Bluetooth uses frequency-hopping spread spectrum to avoid interference with other
signals in the same frequency band, meaning that two devices communicate data with each
other on specific channels at specific times, and continuously hop between channels to transfer
data. This meeting is known as a connection event, and the amount of time between two
connection events is called the connection interval. In Bluetooth Low Energy, the connection
interval is between 7.5 ms to 4 s. In order to stream the data continuously and at the correct
rate, the minimum connection interval is used, at 7.5 ms.
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Figure 3.9: Block diagram of the whole system.
Figure 3.10: Set-up of the system.
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3.3.2 Performance
Fig. 3.11 show the final results of the system. Fig. 3.11a shows the low-frequency, digital
input signal that replicates what a biological sensor would produce. For this test, a 2.5 V, 1
Hz pulse is produced. Fig. 3.11b and fig. 3.11c show the encrypted signal at the transmitter
and receiver, respectively. The logical highs and lows are indistinguishable. The encrypted
signal at the receiver side shows the effect of sampling at 133 Hz on the signal. Fig. 3.11d
shows the recovered signal after subtracting the two chaotic signals for decryption, and the
dashed line is the fully recovered, original signal after running it through a thresholding
algorithm detailed in [4]. The parameters were the following: a weight of 0.4 and a cut of
0.15. It should be noted that the algorithm requires a previous knowledge of the message’s
frequency.
The continuous time fourier transform (CTFT) was taken for the input signal and
encrypted signals. The frequency domain of the encrypted signal is shown in Fig. 3.12,
and the frequency domain of the input signal is shown in Fig. 3.13. The CTFT of Fig. 3.11b
is shown in Fig. 3.12a, and a zoomed-in version of the same graph is shown in Fig. 3.12b.
This signal is before any sampling from the ADC, and represents the original encrypted signal
information. Fig. 3.12c shows the encrypted signal at the receiver side, after it has been
sampled by the ADC on the transmitter side and after it goes back to an analog signal by the
DAC. The sampling process adds some higher frequency components to the signal; however,
the original frequency information is still intact. The low-pass filter is added to remove
those high-frequency components, which is shown in Fig. 3.12d. The frequency information
is not lost from sampling. The slight drop in gain from the low-pass filter does affect the
recovered signal because the chaotic system is sensitive to the trajectory, so any slight change
in information will result in a change in the second chaotic signal being generated, thereby
affecting the decryption process. The result is some missed bits after decryption.
The system operates on a dual supply rail of ± 12 V and a 5 V supply rail. Total power
consumption for transmitting and receiving is 2.8 W, and a breakdown of the power can be
shown in Fig. 3.14. The largest contributor to power consumption is the encryption and
decryption modules, consuming about 80% of the power, or 1.104 W for each board. The
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(a) Input signal. (b) Encrypted signal at the transmitter side.
(c) Encrypted signal at the receiver side. (d) Recovered signal.
Figure 3.11: Experimental Results.
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(a) The frequency domain of the encrypted signal
at the transmitter side before sampling.
(b) A zoomed-in view of the encrypted signal’s
frequency domain (TX side).
(c) The frequency domain of the encrypted signal
at the receiver side after sampling.
(d) The frequency domain of the encrypted signal at
the receiver side after sampling and after the low-pass
filter.
Figure 3.12: Frequency Domain of the Results.
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(a) A zoomed-out graph of the frequency domain. (b) A zoomed-in graph of the frequency domain.
Figure 3.13: Frequency domain of the input signal.
Figure 3.14: A breakdown of power consumption.
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second largest contributor is the interfacing circuits, which consume 528 mW or 19% of the
overall power. The transmitter and ADC consume 0.034 W, and the receiver and the DAC
consume 0.021 W. Each contribute about 1% of the overall power. Power is calculated by
first measuring the current through each supply rail. For the 5 V supply rail, the current
was multiplied by the total voltage (5 V). For the dual supply rails, the higher current from
one of the rails was multiplied by the total voltage change (24 V).
Each module in the system occupies the following area: the encryption/decryption boards
occupy 131 × 56 mm2, the transceiver evaluation boards occupy 96 × 59 mm2, the DAC
occupies 51 × 31 mm2, and the interface circuits occupy 50 × 50 mm2. Since the DAC
sits directly on top of the receiver, it does not add any additional area to the system. The
effective area for the system (in a 2D configuration) is approximately 285 cm2. However, a
stacked configuration with each module would allow for a smaller area, making the effective
area of the system equal to 73.4 cm2. Further reduction in area could be obtained through
implementing the interface circuitry in SMD components on a PCB and making a custom
PCB for the transceiver module instead of using an evaluation board.
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Chapter 4
CMOS Low Noise Amplifier
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Radio Frequency Concepts
Scattering Parameters
In microwave theory, power quantities are usually used over voltage or current qualities for
two main reasons: traditional microwave characterization relies on the amount of power that
is transferred from the preceding stage to the next, and the measurements of high-frequency
power quantities are more straightforward and easier to obtain than high-frequency voltages
or currents [32]. For these reasons, microwave circuits are characteristics by high-frequency
quantities called ”scattering parameters” (S-parameters). S-parameters allow a complicated
circuit or network to be modeled as a ”black box” or an N port network, and they quantify
how RF energy propagates through the network. When a wave encounters an impedance
discontinuity within a circuit, a fraction of the wave will be reflected and the wave continuing
through (incident wave) will lower in magnitude. The reflected wave can scatter to the other
ports of the network. S-parameters describe this response of the network to the incident
signals, and they are defined for a given frequency and system impedance. The subscripts
in the s-parameter Sij refer to the input and output path being measured; i refers to the
responding (output) port and j refers to the incident (input) port.
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In the 2-port network shown in Fig. 4.1, the coefficients a1 and a2 represent the incident
wave and coefficients b1 and b2 represent the reflected waves. The S parameters are related
to the waves as follows:
b1 = S11a1 + S12a2
b2 = S21a1 + S22a2
(4.1)














where S12 is reverse gain coefficient, S21 is forward gain coefficient, S11 is input reflection
coefficient, and S22 is output reflection coefficient.
Impedance Transformation
Impedance matching is used to minimize power loss and thereby maximize power transfer.
Maximum power transfer occurs when the resistance of the load equals the resistance of the
source, and the load and source reactance cancel each other. Impedance matching is used
to transform the impedance to meet this condition as close as possible through the use of
matching networks.
Smith Chart
The Smith chart is the most widely used tool to solve transmission line problems. It also
aids in designing matching networks. Shown in Fig. 4.2, the Smith chart is a polar plot of
the voltage reflection coefficient (Γ), defined as:
Γ = ReflectedWave
IncidentWave




Figure 4.1: Scattering Parameters for a 2-Port Network.
Figure 4.2: Smith Chart. [41]
43
where ZS is the source impedance and ZL is the load impedance from the impedance
discontinuity. It is used to convert reflection coefficients to and from normalized impedances
(or admittances) with respect to the source impedance (or admittance).
The chart contains constant resistance circles and constant reactance circles. The open
circuit is on the right side of the circle (infinite resistance) and the short circuit is on the left
side (zero resistance). The upper half of the circle is inductive due to the positive reactance,
and lower half is capacitive due to the negative reactance.
Noise
Because noise is a random process, noise is measured by its distribution of power over a
range of frequency. Thermal noise and flicker noise are the two main sources of noise for the
LNA. Flicker noise is due to fluctuations in the current when charge carriers are randomly
captured and released from traps at the silicon-silicon dioxide interface. Thermal noise comes
from heat and is dependent on temperature. The effect of noise can be modeled as either a
voltage source or current source [32]. For a resistor, the effect of noise can be modeled as a
voltage source in series with the resistor R1 or a current source in parallel with the resistor





where V is the value voltage source and I is the value of the current source, k is Boltzmann’s
constant, and T is temperature. For MOSFETs, thermal noise can be modeled as a voltage
source in series with the gate, or a current source between the drain and source connections,





for the voltage and current source, respectively. The excess noise coefficient γ is dependent
on the technology process, and gm is the transconductance of the transistor.
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The contribution of noise is measured by signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), which is defined as
the signal power divided by the noise power. Another main measure of noise is the noise
figure (NF),
NF = 10log( SNRin
SNRout
) (4.6)
where SNRinin is the SNR at the input of the circuit blackbox, and SNRout is the SNR at
the output. Another definition of NF is the total noise at the output divided by the noise at





where k is Boltzmann’s constant, T is temperature (K), Rs is the source impedance (usually
50 Ω), V 2n,out is output power, and A0 is gain.
In the receiver chain, the LNA is the largest contributor to the noise figure, as its
performance directly impacts the whole receiver’s performance. The noise figure of the
LNA directly adds to that of the receiver. The gain should be large enough to minimize
the noise contribution of the following stages, but not too large as to compromise the noise
figure and linearity [32].
4.1.2 IEEE 802.15.6 Standard
The first standard for BSNs is the IEEE 802.15.6 standard [3], which supports low
power, short-range, and highly reliable communication. This standard defines the different
frequency bands that can be used for body area networks. There are three categories
for the frequency bands: human body communication (HBC), narrowband communication
(NB), and ultra-wideband communication (UWB). One NB band is the Medical Implantable
Communication Services (MICS) band, operating between 402-405 MHz. This band is
dedicated for implantable medical devices. Other NB bands include the ISM bands 2.4
GHz and and 915 MHz. Wearable sensors most commonly use the 2.4 GHz band because
many communication protocols already operate on it, such as Zigbee, Bluetooth, and Wifi.
This band also allows for a small antenna and a small design. However, the body shadowing
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effect can lead to significant path loss on frequencies over 1 GHz, which makes the 915 MHz
an attractive alternative [42].
The design presented is a dual-band low noise amplifier that operates between 402-405
MHz (MICS band) and between 902-928 MHz (ISM band). The 915 MHz ISM band was
chosen instead of the 2.4 GHz band in order to have less pass loss and less congestion due
to other communication protocols. The concurrent dual-band topology was chosen to be
able to operate at the desired frequencies at the same time and reject other frequency bands.
The unique combination of input and output matching networks creates an LNA competitive
with similar reported works in literature. The LNA could potentially be used in a receiver
for both implantable and wearable sensors.
4.2 Design and Simulation
Portions of this section were published in “A Concurrent MICS/ISM Dual-Band CMOS
Low Noise Amplifier for an Integrated Body Sensor Network,” IEEE Asia-Pacific Microwave
Conference (APMC), 2020.
4.2.1 Design
The low noise amplifier, Fig. 4.3, is in a current-reuse topology. Adding the second transistor
improves stability and isolation between the input and output, while ”reusing” the same
current from the first transistor. There is a trade-off that exists for the sizing of the width of
the second transistor W2. The noise power increases as the width increases, and as the width
of M2 increases, the capacitance at the node between M1 and M2 reduces. This reduced
capacitance causes noise mismatch and increased equivalent noise resistance (Rn) value [43].
For this reason, the width of M2 is the same as M1. Both transistors are biased in weak
inversion to yield a high transconductance. This can be estimated by the weak inversion








Figure 4.3: LNA Schematic.
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where ID is drain current, Id0 is a function of oxide capacitance and mobility, W/L is the
aspect ratio, n is the subthreshold slope, and Ut is thermal voltage. The bias voltage applied
to bias the transistors is 0.65 V. Capacitors CO, C1, and Cb are DC blocking capacitors.
The gain and noise figure circles for each frequency band before any matching networks are
added are shown in Fig. 4.4, which were used to help design the input and output matching
networks for each band.
Input Matching Network
The input matching network combines two matching network in series. The first uses the
gate inductor Lg for the 915 MHz band and the second uses an L-shaped matching network









Lt = Lg + Ls
Ct = Cgs1 + Cex.
(4.10)
The impedance at the MICS center frequency was calculated using Eq. 4.9 and modeled
as a capacitor and resistor in series (Fig. 4.5). A L-matching network was used to create a




To lower load impedance, the network is in shunt with the load. A DC blocking capacitor
C1 is added to prevent current flow in the input matching network. The network values are,
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(a) Noise circles at 403.5 MHz. (b) Noise circles at 915 MHz.
(c) Gain circles at 403.5 MHz (d) Gain circles at 915 MHz
Figure 4.4: Gain and noise figure circles of amplifier without matching networks.





Rp = Rs(Q2 + 1)
C1 = 1ωQRs
L1 = RpQω .
(4.12)
Output Matching Network
Two LC tanks are added in series with one another, or two bandpass filters connected in















which, after simplifying, yields
Zout =
jω(LI + LM − ω2LILMCM − ω2LICILM)
ω4LICILMCM − ω2(LICI + LMCM) + 1
(4.14)




which is used to size the component values for the correct frequencies. The output capacitor
CO is sized to minimize S22.
4.2.2 Simulations
The equations in section II were used to derive the component values in Fig. 4.3. The design
was then simulated using Cadence’s Virtuoso Spectre in a commercial 1 poly 6 metal 180 nm
process, and simulation results are shown in Fig. 4.6. Published simulation results do not
factor in parasitic capacitances and inductances from ESD circuits, pad frame, packaging,
or wire bonds.
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Figure 4.6: Simulated results of return loss, gain, and NF.
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Using a 1.8 V supply rail, the LNA draws 2 mA of current. At 403.5 MHz, the input and
output return loss are -14.7 dB and -26.3 dB, respectively. The gain is 17 dB and the NF is
2.3 dB. At 915 MHz, the input and output return loss are -18.3 and -20.9 dB, respectively.
The gain is 12.7 dB and the NF is 1.7 dB.
The effects of mismatch and process variation on the RF transistors and MIM capacitors
were evaluated using Monte Carlo simulations for input and output return loss, gain, and
noise figure. Out of 250 runs, Monte Carlo analysis demonstrates that the design maintains
a competitive range for a majority of the runs. For all runs, the gain and noise figure
values stay within a competitive range. For the majority of runs, return loss stays within a
competitive range. More specifically, for 86.0% of runs, input return loss stays better than
10 dB. For (94.4%) of runs, output return loss stays better than 10 dB, and the results are
shown in Fig. 4.7 and tabulated in Table 4.1. If a fabricated design did have poor return
loss, the performance could be tweaked by adjusting the DC blocking capacitor values, which
would positively affect gain and noise figure as well.
4.3 Results
The integrated circuit (IC) was taped-out in a commercial 1 poly 6 metal 180 nm process,
and the photomicrograph can be seen in Fig. 4.8. The area of the circuit is approximately
830 × 915 µm2 within a 2 × 2 mm2 padframe. Originally, the IC was going to be directly
wire-bonded to a PCB for testing. The PCB designed in Fig. 4.9 contains matched 50 Ω
transmission lines in the RF input and output paths, the off-chip input matching network,
and the DC biasing with bypass capacitors to short the AC noise from the DC voltage
source.The input matching network for the MICS band consisted of a 56 nH inductor at
gate. The input matching network for the MICS band consisted of a 1 ρF capacitor, a 1 µF
DC blocking capacitor, and a 48 nH inductor. The changes in values were to account for the
parasitics from the pad frame and PCB board. The area for the IC was a 2.2 × 2.2 mm2
copper trace with vias to ground to connect the substrate ground to the board’s ground.
The traces for wire bonding were 200 µm away from the IC and the minimum distance of
6 mil, or 152.4 µm, wide. The distance between traces was also 152.4 µm apart. Since the
52
Figure 4.7: Monte Carlo results for S21 and NF at (a) 403.5 MHz and (b) 915 MHz.
Table 4.1: A summary of the Monte Carlo analysis.
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Figure 4.8: Chip Photomicrograph.
Figure 4.9: Fabricated PCB for the LNA.
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IC was shared with other circuits, the other inputs were grounded. However, the wire bond
machine was not used in the end because the machine was not working consistently, and no
successful wire bonds could be made on the PCB traces due to the lead-free HAL finish.
Future PCB boards are suggested to have an ENIG or ENIPIG finish.
The probe station was used instead of the wire bonding machine. The PCB was cut into
two so that the off-chip input matching network could still be connected to the circuit, and
the output port ground was connected to the PCB board ground, as shown in Fig. 4.10.
A total of 4 probes were used: two DC probes for the DC biasing (VDD and Vbias) and
2 RF probes for the RF input and output pins. The RF probe has 3 connections: ground,
signal, ground. Because the circuit and padframe were not designed for this, the two ground
connections were left open on the probe end, as shown in Fig. 4.11. For future designs, the
RF probe connections are spaces 100 µm apart, so the pads in the pad frame would need
to be spaced out wider to account for this, and two ground connections would need to be
placed to surround the signal connection.
The experimental results for this setup can be seen in Fig. 4.12. Fig. 4.12a and 4.12b
show the input and output return loss, respectively. The output return loss shows a dip
near the desired ISM band, but a negligible dip near the MICS band. This loss could
be explained by parasitic capacitance from the probes, which kills the MICS band return
loss and impacts the ISM band return loss. Two resonances occur at the input matching
network; however, they are not at the correct frequencies. Possible explanations could be
again parasitic capacitances affecting results along with parasitic inductances in the probes.
Also, parasitic inductance from the solder and SMAs most likely shifted results. Because the
input and output return loss is severely impacted by parasitics, the reverse and forward gain
coefficients are severely impacted as well. This explains why S12 and S21 do not resemble
simulation results, shown in Fig. 4.12c and Fig. 4.12d.
Another major factor that impacted performance was the open ground connections on
the RF probes. The length of the RF probes and cables were roughly 140 cm combined.
The wavelength of 403.5 MHz is 74.3 cm, and the wavelength of 915 MHz is 32.8 cm. This
means that the electromagnetic signals have to travel over one wavelength to reach the RF
ground on the other ends of the probes, resulting in degradation of the RF electromagnetic
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Figure 4.10: Setup to Probe Station.
Figure 4.11: The RF and DC probe connections on the chip.
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(a) S11 (b) S22
(c) S12 (d) S21
Figure 4.12: Experimental Results.
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waves and negatively impacting the signal. Current draw for the chip was around 1.5 mA,





This thesis detailed the first generation system implementation of a wireless chaotic
communication system that uses time-scaling chaotic shift keying, which can be used for
body sensor network applications. A streaming algorithm was developed and successfully
integrated with the Bluetooth Low Energy communication stack. Interface circuits were
designed and experimentally verified to enable integration of the encrytpion and transceiver
modules. The system adds a layer of security to WSNs on top of the security methods
that the communication protocol provides. Chaotic shift keying is an attractive real-time
encryption method because it can be implemented in hardware using analog multipliers,
operational amplifiers, resistors and capacitors using competitive power consumption to
software implementations. Typical microcontroller implementations of security systems
range from 2 W to 5 W; this proposed system consumes approximately 2.8 W. Chaotic shift
keying can also be implemented on-chip, as proposed in [13]. This means that encryption can
be taped out on the same chip as a sensor, protecting the data as soon as its produced. Power
consumption is significantly reduced in IC implementations of chaotic shift keying. Another
appealing property of this encryption method is that if an attacker wanted to decrypt the
signal, they would need to replicate the exact chaotic system. Any variation in component
values would change the system parameters and would therefore result in an inability to
recover the original message signal. A replica for IC implementation chaotic systems would
prove even more challenging, as fabrication of the IC costs thousands of dollars. If an attack
wanted to use a return map attack to recover the message signal, the time-scaling factor in
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this implementation protects against this by obscuring the changing system characteristics
of the system.
The wireless system demonstrates that this particular encryption method can be used
for wireless body sensor networks. Many wireless body sensor networks use Bluetooth Low
Energy for their communication protocol. The main limiting factor in Bluetooth Low Energy
is a maximum streaming rate of 133 Hz, which stems from the minimum connection event
interval being 7.5 ms. Frequency domain analysis shows that the information in the frequency
spectrum is maintained after sampling and filtering. A small change in the magnitude of the
frequency information does result in occasionally missed bits due to the nature of the chaotic
system being sensitive to different trajectories. To be truly competitive with wearable sensor
nodes in literature, power and area need to be significantly reduced, which can be achieved
by integrating the entire system. The encryption method has already been integrated and
fabricated [13]. Future work will include the design and fabrication of a custom transceiver
to put on the same chip as the encryption method.
This thesis also detailed the design, fabrication, and testing of a CMOS dual-band low
noise amplifier. This design can be used in WBSN receivers that collect data from both
implantable and wearable sensors. The design is compatible with the IEEE 802.15.6 standard
for wireless body area networks. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this published
design is the only work in literature that operates concurrently at the Medical Implantable
Communication Services (MICS) band and the 915 MHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical
(ISM) band. The design uses two LC tanks for the output matching network. For the input
matching network, an inductor was added for the first band, and an L-shaped matching
network was added for the second band. The matching networks were designed to transform
the impedance of the input and output to yield high gain and low noise figure results. The
transistors were biased in weak inversion to yield a high transconductance.
While the LNA simulation results were promising, the results did not match the
simulation. Many unaccounted for factors contributed to this. First, since the IC was
originally going to be directly wire bonded to a PCB, there was no parasitic model for
packaging or for the probes used in the probe station. The parasitic model used was
a 1 nH inductor at all of the ports (RF input, RF output, VDD, GND) for the wire
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bonds. The ESD protection circuits from the padframe were simulated with the design
as well. Therefore, parasitic capacitance from the probes impacted performance. Parasitic
inductance from the probes probably impacted performace as well; however, the effect was
not as big as the parasitic capacitance since there was some parasitic inductance model in
the simulated design. The PCB for the input matching network also introduced significant
parasitic inductance and thereby shifting the resonances. Even though the transmission lines
were simulated in ADS after the S-parameters of the circuit was extracted from Cadence,
the effect of solder and SMAs were not included in simulation. Lastly, the RF probes used
in the probe station had a ground, signal, ground connection, which was not accounted for
in the original design. The ground signals had to be left open, which means the RF signal
did not have an immediate ground, resulting in dissipation in the electromagnetic waves. All
of these factors negatively impacted performance. However, the current draw was similar to
simulated current, showing that the transistors are working and turned on. Small resonances
in input and output return loss show potential in LNA performance if some of the above
issues were fixed. For example, packaging the IC could mitigate the effect of the ground
problem, since the RF ground would be about 2 mm apart (the length of the padframe)
instead of the length of the RF probe and cables apart. The input matching network could
be tweaked to account for shifts from solder and SMAs to produce resonances in the correct
places.
5.1 Future Work
More work can be taken to further develop this system. The following points are some
possible ideas:
1. A custom PCB can be developed to include the wireless MCU, the DAC, and the buffer
stages and signal processing circuitry. The developed code presented in this thesis can be
uploaded onto the wireless MCU. This would make the system more compact and may
improve performance due to the reduced parasitics.
2. The use of nano-fabricated electrodes can be considered to implement this system as a
wearable sensor node. Also, adding more sensors to create a fuller monitoring node.
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3. Further research can be taken into chaotic circuit implementations in order to increase
the input frequency range of the system. In this thesis, the digital data is running at 1
Hz, which is impractical for many applications. Newer implementations of chaos need to be
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The base code is from Texas Instruments and developed using Code Composer Studio version
10.2.1.00009 and Sensor Controller Studio version 2.6.0.132. The base project files are Project
Zero for the transmitter and Host Test App for the receiver, both from SDK 5.10.00.48. The
additional system configuration settings that were added are summarized for the transmitter
and the receiver in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. The subsections show the files within
the project, and the numbers are the line numbers where the code is added.
Table 1: Added System Configuration Tool Settings for the Transmitter’s Code (Project
Zero).
Added Driver Instance Name Pin Number Notes
ADCBuff CONFIG ADCBUF 0 DIO 30 –
Table 2: Added System Configuration Tool Settings for the Receiver’s Code (Host Test
App).
Added Driver Instance Name Pin Number Notes
GPIO
CONFIG GPIO SS* DIO 0 Output, Low strength,
High initial stateCONFIG GPIO CLR DIO 15
SPI CONFIG SPI MASTER





*Note: DIO 0 should be externally connected to DIO 14 to connect correctly to
the DAC. The external connection avoids hardware conflict.
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A.1 cipherService.h
1 # ifndef _CIPHERSERVICE_H_















17 // Service UUID
18 # define CIPHERSERVICE_SERV_UUID 0xBA55
19
20 // CipherValue Characteristic defines
21 # define CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_ID 0
22 # define CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_UUID 0x2BAD
23 # define CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_LEN 20
24
25 // Characteristic defines
26 # define CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_ID 1
27 # define CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_UUID 0x2BAE












39 * Profile Callbacks
40 */
41
42 // Callback when a characteristic value has changed
43 typedef void (* cipherServiceChange_t )( uint16_t connHandle , uint8_t




47 cipherServiceChange_t pfnChangeCb ; // Called when
↪→ characteristic value changes
48 cipherServiceChange_t pfnCfgChangeCb ;










59 * CipherService_AddService - Initializes the CipherService service
↪→ by registering
60 * GATT attributes with the GATT server .
61 *
62 */
63 extern bStatus_t CipherService_AddService ( uint8_t rspTaskId );
64
65 /*
66 * CipherService_RegisterAppCBs - Registers the application
↪→ callback function .
72
67 * Only call this function once.
68 *
69 * appCallbacks - pointer to application callbacks .
70 */




74 * CipherService_SetParameter - Set a CipherService parameter .
75 *
76 * param - Profile parameter ID
77 * len - length of data to right
78 * value - pointer to data to write. This is dependent on
79 * the parameter ID and WILL be cast to the appropriate
80 * data type ( example : data type of uint16 will be cast to
81 * uint16 pointer ).
82 */
83 extern bStatus_t CipherService_SetParameter ( uint8_t param , uint16_t
↪→ len , void *value);
84
85 /*
86 * CipherService_GetParameter - Get a CipherService parameter .
87 *
88 * param - Profile parameter ID
89 * value - pointer to data to write. This is dependent on
90 * the parameter ID and WILL be cast to the appropriate
91 * data type ( example : data type of uint16 will be cast to
92 * uint16 pointer ).
93 */
94 extern bStatus_t CipherService_GetParameter ( uint8_t param , uint16_t















4 # include <string .h>
5
6 # include <icall.h>
7
8 /* This Header file contains all BLE API and icall structure
↪→ definition */
9 # include " icall_ble_api .h"
10



















29 // cipherService Service UUID
30 CONST uint8_t cipherServiceUUID [ ATT_BT_UUID_SIZE ] =
31 {




35 // cipherValue UUID
36 CONST uint8_t cipherService_CipherValueUUID [ ATT_UUID_SIZE ] =
37 {
38 TI_BASE_UUID_128 ( CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_UUID )
39 };
40 // streamEN UUID
41 CONST uint8_t cipherService_StreamENUUID [ ATT_UUID_SIZE ] =
42 {




47 * LOCAL VARIABLES
48 */
49
50 static cipherServiceCBs_t * pAppCBs = NULL;
51
52 /* ****************************
53 * Profile Attributes - variables
54 */
55
56 // Service declaration
57 static CONST gattAttrType_t cipherServiceDecl = { ATT_BT_UUID_SIZE ,
↪→ cipherServiceUUID };
58
59 // Characteristic " CipherValue " Properties (for declaration )




62 // Characteristic " CipherValue " Value variable
63 static uint8_t cipherService_CipherValueVal [
↪→ CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_LEN ] = {0};
64
65 // Characteristic " CipherValue " CCCD
66 static gattCharCfg_t * cipherService_CipherValueConfig ;
67 // Characteristic " StreamEN " Properties (for declaration )




71 // Characteristic " StreamEN " Value variable
72 static uint8_t cipherService_StreamENVal [ CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_LEN
↪→ ] = {0};
73
74 /* ****************************
75 * Profile Attributes - Table
76 */
77
78 static gattAttribute_t cipherServiceAttrTbl [] =
79 {
80 // cipherService Service Declaration
81 {
82 { ATT_BT_UUID_SIZE , primaryServiceUUID },
83 GATT_PERMIT_READ ,
84 0,
85 ( uint8_t *)& cipherServiceDecl
86 },
87 // CipherValue Characteristic Declaration
88 {






94 // CipherValue Characteristic Value
95 {





101 // CipherValue CCCD
102 {
103 { ATT_BT_UUID_SIZE , clientCharCfgUUID },
104 GATT_PERMIT_READ | GATT_PERMIT_WRITE ,
105 0,
106 (uint8 *)& cipherService_CipherValueConfig
107 },
108 // StreamEN Characteristic Declaration
109 {





115 // StreamEN Characteristic Value
116 {
117 { ATT_UUID_SIZE , cipherService_StreamENUUID },







125 * LOCAL FUNCTIONS
126 */
127 static bStatus_t cipherService_ReadAttrCB ( uint16_t connHandle ,
↪→ gattAttribute_t *pAttr ,
77
128 uint8_t *pValue ,
↪→ uint16_t *pLen ,
↪→ uint16_t offset ,
129 uint16_t maxLen , uint8_t
↪→ method );
130 static bStatus_t cipherService_WriteAttrCB ( uint16_t connHandle ,
↪→ gattAttribute_t *pAttr ,
131 uint8_t *pValue ,
↪→ uint16_t len ,
↪→ uint16_t offset ,
132 uint8_t method );
133
134 /* ****************************
135 * PROFILE CALLBACKS
136 */
137 // Simple Profile Service Callbacks
138 CONST gattServiceCBs_t cipherServiceCBs =
139 {
140 cipherService_ReadAttrCB , // Read callback function pointer
141 cipherService_WriteAttrCB , // Write callback function pointer









150 * CipherService_AddService - Initializes the CipherService service
↪→ by registering
151 * GATT attributes with the GATT server .
152 *
153 */
154 extern bStatus_t CipherService_AddService ( uint8_t rspTaskId )
155 {
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156 uint8_t status ;
157
158 // Allocate Client Characteristic Configuration table
159 cipherService_CipherValueConfig = ( gattCharCfg_t *) ICall_malloc (
↪→ sizeof ( gattCharCfg_t ) * linkDBNumConns );
160 if ( cipherService_CipherValueConfig == NULL )
161 {
162 return ( bleMemAllocError );
163 }
164
165 // Initialize Client Characteristic Configuration attributes
166 GATTServApp_InitCharCfg ( LINKDB_CONNHANDLE_INVALID ,
↪→ cipherService_CipherValueConfig );
167 // Register GATT attribute list and CBs with GATT Server App





171 & cipherServiceCBs );
172




177 * CipherService_RegisterAppCBs - Registers the application
↪→ callback function .
178 * Only call this function once.
179 *
180 * appCallbacks - pointer to application callbacks .
181 */
182 bStatus_t CipherService_RegisterAppCBs ( cipherServiceCBs_t *
↪→ appCallbacks )
183 {
184 if ( appCallbacks )
185 {
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186 pAppCBs = appCallbacks ;
187









197 * CipherService_SetParameter - Set a CipherService parameter .
198 *
199 * param - Profile parameter ID
200 * len - length of data to right
201 * value - pointer to data to write. This is dependent on
202 * the parameter ID and WILL be cast to the appropriate
203 * data type ( example : data type of uint16 will be cast to
204 * uint16 pointer ).
205 */
206 bStatus_t CipherService_SetParameter ( uint8_t param , uint16_t len ,
↪→ void *value )
207 {
208 bStatus_t ret = SUCCESS ;
209 switch ( param )
210 {
211 case CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_ID :
212 if ( len == CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_LEN )
213 {
214 memcpy ( cipherService_CipherValueVal , value , len);
215
216 // Log_info0 ("In SetParameter beofre notifications ");
217
218 // Try to send notification .
219 GATTServApp_ProcessCharCfg ( cipherService_CipherValueConfig

















231 case CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_ID :
232 if ( len == CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_LEN )
233 {

















251 * CipherService_GetParameter - Get a CipherService parameter .
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252 *
253 * param - Profile parameter ID
254 * value - pointer to data to write. This is dependent on
255 * the parameter ID and WILL be cast to the appropriate
256 * data type ( example : data type of uint16 will be cast to
257 * uint16 pointer ).
258 */
259 bStatus_t CipherService_GetParameter ( uint8_t param , uint16_t *len ,
↪→ void *value )
260 {
261 bStatus_t ret = SUCCESS ;
262 switch ( param )
263 {
264 case CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_ID :













277 * @fn cipherService_ReadAttrCB
278 *
279 * @brief Read an attribute .
280 *
281 * @param connHandle - connection message was received on
282 * @param pAttr - pointer to attribute
283 * @param pValue - pointer to data to be read
284 * @param pLen - length of data to be read
285 * @param offset - offset of the first octet to be read
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286 * @param maxLen - maximum length of data to be read
287 * @param method - type of read message
288 *
289 * @return SUCCESS , blePending or Failure
290 */
291 static bStatus_t cipherService_ReadAttrCB ( uint16_t connHandle ,
↪→ gattAttribute_t *pAttr ,
292 uint8_t *pValue , uint16_t *
↪→ pLen , uint16_t offset ,
293 uint16_t maxLen , uint8_t
↪→ method )
294 {
295 bStatus_t status = SUCCESS ;
296
297 // See if request is regarding the CipherValue Characteristic
↪→ Value
298 if ( ! memcmp (pAttr ->type.uuid , cipherService_CipherValueUUID ,
↪→ pAttr ->type.len) )
299 {
300 if ( offset > CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_LEN ) // Prevent
↪→ malicious ATT ReadBlob offsets .
301 {




306 *pLen = MIN(maxLen , CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_LEN - offset );
↪→ // Transmit as much as possible
307 memcpy (pValue , pAttr -> pValue + offset , *pLen);
308 }
309 }
310 // See if request is regarding the StreamEN Characteristic Value
311 else if ( ! memcmp (pAttr ->type.uuid , cipherService_StreamENUUID ,
↪→ pAttr ->type.len) )
312 {
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313 if ( offset > CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_LEN ) // Prevent
↪→ malicious ATT ReadBlob offsets .
314 {




319 *pLen = MIN(maxLen , CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_LEN - offset ); //
↪→ Transmit as much as possible





325 // If we get here , that means you ’ve forgotten to add an if
↪→ clause for a
326 // characteristic value attribute in the attribute table that
↪→ has READ permissions .
327 *pLen = 0;
328 status = ATT_ERR_ATTR_NOT_FOUND ;
329 }
330





336 * @fn cipherService_WriteAttrCB
337 *
338 * @brief Validate attribute data prior to a write operation
339 *
340 * @param connHandle - connection message was received on
341 * @param pAttr - pointer to attribute
342 * @param pValue - pointer to data to be written
343 * @param len - length of data
344 * @param offset - offset of the first octet to be written
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345 * @param method - type of write message
346 *
347 * @return SUCCESS , blePending or Failure
348 */
349 static bStatus_t cipherService_WriteAttrCB ( uint16_t connHandle ,
↪→ gattAttribute_t *pAttr ,
350 uint8_t *pValue , uint16_t
↪→ len , uint16_t offset ,
351 uint8_t method )
352 {
353 bStatus_t status = SUCCESS ;
354 uint8_t paramID = 0xFF;
355
356 // See if request is regarding a Client Characterisic
↪→ Configuration
357 if ( ! memcmp (pAttr ->type.uuid , clientCharCfgUUID , pAttr ->type.
↪→ len) )
358 {
359 // Allow only notifications .
360 status = GATTServApp_ProcessCCCWriteReq ( connHandle , pAttr ,
↪→ pValue , len , offset , GATT_CLIENT_CFG_NOTIFY );
361 }
362 // See if request is regarding the StreamEN Characteristic Value
363 else if ( ! memcmp (pAttr ->type.uuid , cipherService_StreamENUUID ,
↪→ pAttr ->type.len) )
364 {
365 if ( offset + len > CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_LEN )
366 {




371 // Copy pValue into the variable we point to from the
↪→ attribute table.
372 memcpy (pAttr -> pValue + offset , pValue , len);
373
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374 // Only notify application if entire expected value is
↪→ written
375 if ( offset + len == CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_LEN )





381 // If we get here , that means you ’ve forgotten to add an if
↪→ clause for a
382 // characteristic value attribute in the attribute table that
↪→ has WRITE permissions .
383 status = ATT_ERR_ATTR_NOT_FOUND ;
384 }
385
386 // Let the application know something changed (if it did) by
↪→ using the
387 // callback it registered earlier (if it did).
388 if ( paramID != 0xFF)
389 if ( pAppCBs && pAppCBs -> pfnChangeCb )
390 pAppCBs -> pfnChangeCb (connHandle , paramID , len , pValue ); //
↪→ Call app function from stack task context .
391
392 return status ;
393 }
A.3 project zero.c
52 # include <ti/ drivers /SPI.h>
53 # include <ti/ drivers /GPIO.h>
54 # include <ti/ drivers / ADCBuf .h>
...
101 # include " services / cipherService .h"
102 # include "scif.h"
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119 # define ADCSAMPLESIZE ( CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_LEN /2)
120
121 uint16_t sampleBufferOne [ ADCSAMPLESIZE ];
122 uint16_t sampleBufferTwo [ ADCSAMPLESIZE ];
123 uint8_t updateArray [2* ADCSAMPLESIZE ];
124
125 ADCBuf_Handle adcBuf ;
126 ADCBuf_Conversion continuousConversion ;
...
163 # define PZ_SC_CTRL_READY 11 /* Sensor controller control
↪→ ready */
164 # define PZ_SC_TASK_ALERT 12 /* Sensor controller task alert
↪→ */
165 # define PZ_ADC_UPDATE 13 /* My defined message to test
↪→ */
...
481 // Sensor Controller functions
482 static void scCtrlReadyCallback (void);
483 static void scTaskAlertCallback (void);
484 static void processTaskAlert (void);
485
486 static void myProcessTask (void);
487
488 void adcBufCallback ( ADCBuf_Handle handle , ADCBuf_Conversion *
↪→ conversion ,
489 void * completedADCBuffer , uint32_t completedChannel ,
↪→ int_fast16_t status );
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...
541 // Service callback function implementation
542 // CipherService callback handler . The type cipherServiceCBs_t is
↪→ defined in cipherService .h
543 static cipherServiceCBs_t user_cipherServiceCBs =
544 {
545 . pfnChangeCb = user_cipherService_ValueChangeCB , //
↪→ Characteristic value change callback handler










556 static void scCtrlReadyCallback (void)
557 {
558 // Notify application ‘Control READY ‘ is active
559 ProjectZero_enqueueMsg ( PZ_SC_CTRL_READY , 0);
560 } // scCtrlReadyCallback
561
562 static void scTaskAlertCallback (void)
563 {
564 // Notify application ‘Task ALERT ‘ is active
565 ProjectZero_enqueueMsg ( PZ_SC_TASK_ALERT , 0);
566 } // scTaskAlertCallback
567
568 static void processTaskAlert (void)
569 {
570 // Clear the ALERT interrupt source
571 scifClearAlertIntSource ();
572




576 // Acknowledge the ALERT event
577 scifAckAlertEvents ();
578 } // processTaskAlert
579
580
581 void adcBufCallback ( ADCBuf_Handle handle , ADCBuf_Conversion *
↪→ conversion ,
582 void * completedADCBuffer , uint32_t completedChannel ,
↪→ int_fast16_t status )
583 {
584 uint16_t i, n;
585
586 if ( completedADCBuffer == conversion -> sampleBuffer ){
587 for (i = 0; i < ADCSAMPLESIZE ; i++) {
588 updateArray [n] = sampleBufferOne [i] >> 8;
589 n++;
590 updateArray [n] = sampleBufferOne [i] & 0xff;
591 n++;
592 }
593 } else if ( completedADCBuffer == conversion -> sampleBufferTwo ){
594 for (i = 0; i < ADCSAMPLESIZE ; i++) {
595 updateArray [n] = sampleBufferTwo [i] >> 8;
596 n++;






603 ProjectZero_enqueueMsg ( PZ_ADC_UPDATE ,0);
604 }
605
606 static void myProcessTask (void){
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607 CipherService_SetParameter ( CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_ID , 2*
↪→ ADCSAMPLESIZE , (void *) updateArray );
608 }
...
736 CipherService_AddService ( selfEntity );
...
772 CipherService_RegisterAppCBs (& user_cipherServiceCBs );
...
790 // Initalization of characteristics in cipherService that are
↪→ readable .
791 uint8_t cipherService_cipherValue_initVal [
↪→ CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_LEN ] = {0};
792 CipherService_SetParameter ( CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_ID ,
↪→ CIPHERSERVICE_CIPHERVALUE_LEN ,
↪→ cipherService_cipherValue_initVal );
793 uint8_t cipherService_streamEN_initVal [
↪→ CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_LEN ] = {0};









846 // Initialize application
847 ProjectZero_init ();
848




851 ADCBuf_Params adcBufParams ;
852
853 /* Set up an ADCBuf peripheral in
↪→ ADCBuf_RECURRENCE_MODE_CONTINUOUS */
854 ADCBuf_Params_init (& adcBufParams );
855
856 adcBufParams . callbackFxn = adcBufCallback ;
857 adcBufParams . recurrenceMode = ADCBuf_RECURRENCE_MODE_CONTINUOUS
↪→ ;
858 adcBufParams . returnMode = ADCBuf_RETURN_MODE_CALLBACK ;
859 adcBufParams . samplingFrequency = 1000;
860 adcBuf = ADCBuf_open ( CONFIG_ADCBUF_0 , & adcBufParams );
861
862 /* Configure the conversion struct */
863 continuousConversion .arg = NULL;
864 continuousConversion . adcChannel = CONFIG_ADCBUF_0_CHANNEL_0 ;
865 continuousConversion . sampleBuffer = sampleBufferOne ;
866 continuousConversion . sampleBufferTwo = sampleBufferTwo ;
867 continuousConversion . samplesRequestedCount = ADCSAMPLESIZE ;
868
869 if ( adcBuf == NULL){
870 /* ADCBuf failed to open. */




875 // // Initialize the Sensor Controller
876 // scifOsalInit ();
877 // scifOsalRegisterCtrlReadyCallback ( scCtrlReadyCallback );
878 // scifOsalRegisterTaskAlertCallback ( scTaskAlertCallback );
879 // scifInit (& scifDriverSetup );
880 //
881 // // Set the Sensor Controller task tick interval to 0.1 second
882 // uint32_t rtc_Hz = 10000;




886 // // Start Sensor Controller task
887 // scifStartTasksNbl (BV( SCIF_ANALOG_LIGHT_SENSOR_TASK_ID ));
...
1011 ADCBuf_close ( adcBuf );
...
1182 case CIPHERSERVICE_SERV_UUID :
1183 user_cipherService_ValueChangeHandler ( pCharData );
1184 break ;
...
1271 case PZ_SC_TASK_ALERT :
1272 processTaskAlert ();
1273 break ;




2664 static void user_cipherService_ValueChangeCB ( uint16_t connHandle ,
2665 uint8_t paramID , uint16_t len ,
2666 uint8_t * pValue )
2667 {
2668 pzCharacteristicData_t * pValChange =
2669 ICall_malloc ( sizeof ( pzCharacteristicData_t ) + len);
2670
2671 if( pValChange != NULL)
2672 {
2673 pValChange -> svcUUID = CIPHERSERVICE_SERV_UUID ;
2674 pValChange -> paramID = paramID ;
2675 memcpy (pValChange ->data , pValue , len);
2676 pValChange -> dataLen = len;
2677





2682 void user_cipherService_ValueChangeHandler ( pzCharacteristicData_t *
↪→ pData)
2683 {
2684 switch (pData -> paramID )
2685 {
2686 case CIPHERSERVICE_STREAMEN_ID :
2687 // Do something useful with pData ->data here
2688 // -------------------------
2689 if (pData ->data [0] == 1){
2690 ADCBuf_convert (adcBuf , & continuousConversion , 1);
2691 } else if (pData ->data [0] == 2) {
2692 GATT_ExchangeMTU (0, 210, 0);
2693 } else {







A.4 host test appc.c
57 # include <ti/ display / Display .h>
58 # include <ti/ drivers /SPI.h>
59 # include <ti/ drivers /GPIO.h>
...
438 static void HostTestApp_taskFxn (UArg a0 , UArg a1)
439 {
440
441 SPI_Handle masterSpi ;
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447 // Initialize application
448 HostTestApp_init ();
449
450 GPIO_setConfig ( CONFIG_GPIO_SS , GPIO_CFG_OUTPUT | GPIO_CFG_OUT_LOW
↪→ );
451 GPIO_setConfig ( CONFIG_GPIO_CLR , GPIO_CFG_OUTPUT |
↪→ GPIO_CFG_OUT_LOW );
452
453 GPIO_write ( CONFIG_GPIO_CLR , 1);
454 GPIO_write ( CONFIG_GPIO_SS , 1);
455
456 /* Open SPI as master ( default ) */
457 SPI_Params_init (& spiParams );
458 spiParams . frameFormat = SPI_POL0_PHA1 ;
459 spiParams . bitRate = 12000000;
460 spiParams . dataSize = 16;
461 masterSpi = SPI_open ( CONFIG_SPI_MASTER , & spiParams );
462 if ( masterSpi == NULL) {
463 GPIO_write ( CONFIG_GPIO_LED_0 ,1);
464 GPIO_write ( CONFIG_GPIO_LED_1 ,0);
465 // while (1);
466 }
467 else {
468 GPIO_write ( CONFIG_GPIO_LED_0 ,0);




500 dealloc = HostTestApp_processStackMsg (( hciPacket_t *)
↪→ pMsg , & masterSpi );
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...
539 SPI_close ( masterSpi );
...
610 return ( HCI_TL_processStructuredEvent (( ICall_Hdr *)pBuf ,
↪→ spiHandle ));
A.5 icall hci tl.c
52 # include <string .h>
53 # include <ti/ drivers /SPI.h>
54 # include <ti/ drivers /GPIO.h>
...
3910 uint8_t HCI_TL_processStructuredEvent ( ICall_Hdr *pEvt , SPI_Handle *
↪→ spiHandle )
3911 {
3912 return ( processEvents (pEvt , spiHandle ));
3913 }
...
6491 static uint8_t processEvents ( ICall_Hdr *pMsg , SPI_Handle * spiHandle
↪→ )
...
6520 case GATT_MSG_EVENT :
6521 pBuf = processEventsGATT (( gattMsgEvent_t *)pMsg , out_msg , (
↪→ uint8_t *)&msgLen , &allocated , spiHandle );
...
6534 if ( msgLen )
6535 {
6536 if (!( pMsg ->event == GATT_MSG_EVENT && Msg -> method ==
↪→ ATT_HANDLE_VALUE_NOTI )){
6537 HCI_TL_SendVSEvent (pBuf , msgLen );
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6538 }
6539 // HCI_TL_SendVSEvent (pBuf , msgLen );




7412 static uint8_t * processEventsGATT ( gattMsgEvent_t *pPkt , uint8_t *
↪→ pOutMsg ,
7413 uint8_t *pMsgLen , uint8_t *
↪→ pAllocated , SPI_Handle *
↪→ spiHandle )
7414 {
7415 uint8_t msgLen = 0, attHdrLen = 0, hdrLen = HCI_EXT_HDR_LEN + 1;
↪→ // hdr + event length
7416 uint8_t *pBuf , * pPayload = NULL;
7417 uint8_t status = pPkt ->hdr. status ;
7418
7419 uint16_t masterTxBuffer [1];
7420 SPI_Transaction transaction ;
...
7499 case ATT_READ_RSP :
7500 {
7501 attReadRsp_t *pRsp = &pPkt ->msg. readRsp ;
7502
7503 msgLen = ATT_BuildReadRsp (& pOutMsg [ hdrLen ], ( uint8_t *)
↪→ pRsp);
7504 pPayload = pRsp -> pValue ;
7505
7506 uint16_t i;
7507 for (i=0; i< msgLen ; i=i+2){
7508 masterTxBuffer [0] = (( uint16_t ) pPayload [i] << 8)
↪→ | pPayload [i+1];
7509 transaction .count = 1;
7510 transaction .rxBuf = (void *) NULL;
96
7511 transaction .txBuf = (void *) masterTxBuffer ;
7512
7513 GPIO_write ( CONFIG_GPIO_SS , 0);
7514 SPI_transfer (* spiHandle , & transaction );




7524 case ATT_READ_BLOB_RSP :
7525 {
7526 attReadBlobRsp_t *pRsp = &pPkt ->msg. readBlobRsp ;
7527
7528 msgLen = ATT_BuildReadBlobRsp (& pOutMsg [ hdrLen ], ( uint8_t
↪→ *) pRsp);




7533 for (i=0; i< msgLen ; i=i+2){
7534 masterTxBuffer [0] = (( uint16_t ) pPayload [i] << 8) |
↪→ pPayload [i+1];
7535 transaction .count = 1;
7536 transaction .rxBuf = (void *) NULL;
7537 transaction .txBuf = (void *) masterTxBuffer ;
7538
7539 GPIO_write ( CONFIG_GPIO_SS , 0);
7540 SPI_transfer (* spiHandle , & transaction );




7626 case ATT_HANDLE_VALUE_NOTI :
7627 {
7628 attHandleValueInd_t *pInd = &pPkt ->msg. handleValueInd ;
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7629
7630 attHdrLen = ATT_HANDLE_VALUE_IND_FIXED_SIZE ;
7631
7632 // Copy request header over
7633 msgLen = ATT_BuildHandleValueInd (& pOutMsg [ hdrLen ], (
↪→ uint8_t *) pInd) - attHdrLen ;
7634 pPayload = pInd -> pValue ;
7635
7636 uint16_t i;
7637 for (i=0; i< msgLen ; i=i+2){
7638 masterTxBuffer [0] = (( uint16_t ) pPayload [i] << 8)
↪→ | pPayload [i+1];
7639 transaction .count = 1;
7640 transaction .rxBuf = (void *) NULL;
7641 transaction .txBuf = (void *) masterTxBuffer ;
7642
7643 GPIO_write ( CONFIG_GPIO_SS , 0);
7644 SPI_transfer (* spiHandle , & transaction );




B Low Noise Amplifier Layout and Testing
There are three circuit implementations within the chip: one with the output matching
network (circuit 1), one with only transistors and capacitors (circuit 2), and one with only
transistors (circuit 3). Fig. 1 shows the pin-out of the chip and Table 3 summarizes the
corresponding connection to each numbered pad.
B.1 Pin-Out
Table 3: Pad Connections










7 Capacitor for ISM OMN
8 Source of Input NMOS
9 RF Input
10 Capacitor for MICS OMN
Circuit 3
1 VDD
11 Gate of Input NMOS
12 Source of Input NMOS
13 Drain of Second NMOS
In circuit 2, the output matching network inductor for the MICS band should be
connected between pad 1 and pad 10. The output matching network inductor for the ISM
band should be connected between pad 7 and pad 10.
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Figure 1: Pin-out of the LNA chip.
B.2 A Note for Future RFIC Chips
Wire Bonding: If you want to wire bond the IC directly to the PCB, make sure the PCB
has an ENIG or ENIPIG finish.
Probe Station: The RF probes at the probe station have 3 connections: ground, signal,
ground. The connections are spaced 100 µm apart. Pads with 60 µm width and 40 µm apart
would work well for this. There is a limit to two RF probes.
101
Vita
Kendra Anderson received her B.S. degree in electrical engineering from the University of
Tennessee in 2019. Later in 2019, she joined the Mlab group at the University of Tennessee
as a research and teaching assistant pursuing her M.S. degree in electrical engineering. Her
current research interests include analog integrated circuit design, radio frequency integrated
circuit design (RFIC), RF/microwave circuits and systems, microelectronics, and wireless
body area networks.
102
